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I
n late 2009, controversy arose over the appointment 
of  Dr.  Bernard  Prigent,  vice-president  of  medical 
affairs for Pfizer Canada, to the Governing Coun-
cil (GC) of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research 
(CIHR). As of 25 January 2010, 4411 people had signed a 
petition for the appointment to be rescinded on grounds 
of conflict of interest. The story attracted considerable 
national media attention1 and generated debate between 
critics and defenders of the appointment.2–7 The appoint-
ment was referred to the Standing Committee on Health 
of the House of Commons, which convened two hearings 
to review it.7 A motion to recommend the withdrawal of 
the appointment was defeated in a split vote.  
Conflict  of  interest  has  many  definitions  applicable 
in diverse settings but, in essence, a conflict is present 
when a person is obliged or inclined to pursue interests 
that compete with one another in fundamental ways. I 
should not sit on a committee selecting a literary award 
winner if my best friend is one of the nominees. I cannot 
simultaneously be a governor of the Toronto Maple Leafs 
and the Montreal Canadiens. The test is not whether my 
interest in X invariably conflicts with my interest in Y; 
it is that there is a reasonable likelihood of the interests 
colliding in non-trivial ways.  
Appearance also matters. If certain appointments and 
proximities raise concerns that science is distorted by 
commercial interests, or favours some types of inquiry 
over others, the public and practitioners may cease to 
pay attention to its findings, be disinclined to volunteer 
to participate in clinical trials, or resent their tax dollars 
flowing to public organizations that fund such research. 
Short of outright scientific misconduct, nothing has so 
potentially chilling an effect on the expansion of science 
and its appropriate application than the perception that 
the enterprise has been bought.
Public  institutions  present  a  special  case  because 
their overarching duty is to serve the public interest—a 
notoriously difficult concept to pin down with precision. 
Importantly, there are those who argue that there is no 
distinct public interest: there are only particular inter-
ests, and it is the balance and interplay among them that 
defines the common good. This view is represented by 
the neoliberal “Chicago School” of economics and others 
who  are  deeply  suspicious  of  government,  regulation, 
broad democratic agendas, and interference in the free 
market. This is a radical contemporary reformulation of 
the historical view that the public interest is more than 
the sum of exchanges among individual interests. That 
view is the foundation of a wide range of political theor-
ies  that  span  the  ideological  spectrum  from  classical 
conservatism  and  liberalism  to  social  democracy  and 
communitarianism. The nuances of these opposing pos-
itions cannot be addressed here; suffice it to say that the 
difference is highly relevant to the Prigent case.  
Dr. Prigent is a long-time drug company executive who 
has worked for Pfizer since 1995. He is among the senior 
officers of Pfizer who are registered as lobbyists with the 
Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, and 
CIHR is listed as one of the targets of Pfizer’s lobbying ac-
tivities (www.ocl-cal.gc.ca). Pfizer’s primary obligation as 
a corporation is to make money for its shareholders, and 
Dr. Prigent’s primary professional obligation is to Pfizer. 
If the choice is between improving the health of the popu-
lation and making money, both must choose the latter. 
For a profit-making corporation, any decline in sales is 
by definition a failure, even if it is attributable to a prod-
uct being supplanted, to the consumer’s advantage, by a 
competitor’s superior product. Any increase in sales is by 
definition a success, even if the added consumption makes 
no contribution to health or even has some deleterious ef-
fect. Pfizer has an obvious interest in the flow of CIHR 
funds to science that may lead to drug development, and 
an obvious interest in diverting CIHR funds away from 
science that may reveal the comparative ineffectiveness of 
one of its drugs or challenge the pharmacological thera-
peutic paradigm. Situationally, Dr. Prigent is bound by the 
same interests, and the GC appointment places him in a 
position to argue for the desired steering effect by virtue 
of GC’s power to create and terminate scientific institutes 
and mount or eliminate programs. At the Standing Committee hearings, CIHR president 
Dr.  Alain  Beaudet  explicitly  called  for  the  CIHR  and 
private industry to align their agendas. On this under-
standing, the interests of pharma are the public interest; 
commercialization and profit in themselves define the 
successful translation of science into public benefit. The 
moral arbiter of commercialization is not a set of ethical 
principles but the health care marketplace. Dr. Beaudet’s 
defence of the appointment has the virtue of clarity: it 
obliterates any perceived conflict between the mission of 
his agency and the commercialization imperative.      
Yet the public institution he heads is funded by tax-
payers who clearly benefit from science that sometimes 
threatens  drug  company  profits.  Hormone  replace-
ment  therapy  for  menopausal  women  and  Vioxx  were 
huge commercial successes but by any reasonable ac-
count public interest failures.8,9 These and many other 
examples make it clear that pharma’s interests at times 
conflict with the public interest as normally understood. 
That being the inescapable conclusion, the Prigent ap-
pointment  is  defensible  only  on  the  neoliberal  under-
standing  of  conflict  of  interest—namely  that  private 
interests and the public interest essentially coincide, and 
where the possibility of conflict of interest exists, the 
remedy is simply to declare rather than avoid it, and rely 
on individuals to rise above it.   
Only the inhabitants of this neoliberal moral universe 
could fail to see the real and apparent ethical flaws in-
herent in appointing an active pharma executive to the 
CIHR GC. Moreover, pharma is not just any commercial 
entity; it has a long history of documented assaults on 
scientific integrity and honest marketing.10 This miscon-
duct has led journal editors to intensify efforts to identify 
conflict of interest and avoid publishing biased findings. 
Having witnessed the impact of systematic inattention 
to both the appearance and reality of conflict of interest, 
the Obama administration has removed numerous regis-
tered lobbyists from public boards.11 Harvard University 
has recently instituted strict new policies that limit med-
ical faculty pay for serving on drug company boards and 
forbid the acceptance of speaking fees from pharma.12 
Canada  is  moving  in  the  opposite  direction  on  the 
premise that the fox, once seated at the henhouse table, 
will honour its pledge to become a vegetarian. To claim 
that  the  Prigent  appointment  is  essential  to  fulfilling 
the  agency’s  commercialization  mandate  is  disingenu-
ous.  Nothing  prevents  the  CIHR  from  seeking  advice 
from  commercial  interests,  both  pharmaceutical  and 
other. Most universities have technology transfer offi-
cers whose mission is the commercialization of academic 
discoveries. Governments regularly communicate with 
registered lobbyists unconflicted by dual loyalties but do 
not appoint them to the Cabinet. Dr. Prigent is an active 
Pfizer  executive  and  a  registered  lobbyist.  This  alone 
should disqualify him from appointment to the GC, as it 
now would in the US.
If the ethics and intellectual justification are flawed, 
the economics are no better. The appointment has been 
defended on the grounds that pharma exemplifies com-
mercialization in its best form. Those who promote the 
alignment of the CIHR and pharmaceutical agendas ap-
pear to be bedazzled by half of the financial statements—
the assets and revenues—but are blind to the liabilities 
and expenditures. Yes, pharma invests in research and 
development,  creates  scientific  and  marketing  jobs, 
makes profits, and pays taxes. This is only half the story. 
The liabilities include a great deal of off-label drug use 
(recently estimated as 20% of all sales,13 or over $4 bil-
lion in Canada), avoidable adverse drug reactions, and 
consumption of expensive new drugs that are no better 
than the cheaper ones they have replaced. The US Food 
and Drug Administration estimates that only a fifth all 
new drugs submitted for approval have the potential to 
add  any  therapeutic  value.14  The  public  subsidizes,  as 
tax-deductible  expenses,  the  very  marketing  practices 
that promote highly inefficient consumption. By the gov-
ernment’s own calculations, the price of generic drugs in 
New Zealand is less than a quarter of the price in Can-
ada; drugs still under patent are 20% cheaper.15   
Commercial  interests  are  indeed  served  by  high 
prices, expanded use irrespective of therapeutic benefit, 
longer patents, and a happy head office in (usually) an-
other country. It is equally clear that these commercial 
successes  are  public  interest  failures.  Of  course  there 
are win-win situations—good drugs at reasonable prices 
used appropriately—but the potential for conflict is ob-
vious,  and  actual  conflicts  are  many.  The  assumption 
that it is possible to align the scientific agenda with the 
pharmaceutical agenda without one or both overhauling 
their mission and values is untenable. The CIHR would 
do well to heed its own analysis: “Interactions between 
academia and industry have sometimes raised questions 
of ethics and integrity, as well as concerns that commer-
cialization opportunities need to be properly evaluated 
and may not always be for the public good.”16 
On general grounds, then, the Prigent appointment 
constitutes a clear conflict of interest unless the concept 
itself is to be abandoned as a serious ethical guide to 
governance structure and behaviour. The selection of a 
Pfizer official adds yet another layer of provocation. The 
government chose to appoint to CIHR’s GC the repre-
sentative of a company that recently paid $2.3 billion in 
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drugs—merely the latest in a series of malfeasances dat-
ing from 2002.17 I can find no record of Dr. Prigent hav-
ing opposed or distanced himself from Pfizer’s felonies. 
The Standing Committee majority dismissed the ques-
tions posed by NDP health critic Judy Wasylycia-Leis 
about whether the company’s transgressions were rel-
evant to his fitness to serve.
More discouraging than the Prigent appointment in 
itself is the refusal of either government or the CIHR to 
acknowledge that the appointment raises even the pos-
sibility of conflict of interest. It is one thing to make and 
defend a decision; it is quite another to refuse to recog-
nize and substantively engage with the very real ethical 
issues at its core. The Standing Committee chose, for its 
second hearing on the appointment, to hear from Dr. 
Jean  Rouleau,  Dean  of  Medicine  at  the  Université  de 
Montréal, a CIHR GC member whose own research has 
been funded by Pfizer and who has negotiated a Pfizer 
grant to his faculty. Neither he nor CIHR thought that 
these relationships created either the appearance or re-
ality of conflict of interest. And herein lies the root of the 
problem: a notion of conflict of interest so stripped of its 
meaning that those who violate it are as oblivious to their 
compromised status as the emperor was unaware of his 
nakedness. In the end, the most disturbing revelation of 
l’affaire Prigent is the ethical obtuseness that pervades 
our political and scientific leadership.    
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